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Abstract 
Based on qualitative and quantitative corpus research, this chapter argues that constructions with 
chance(s) in Present-day English enrich Talmy’s (1988) greater modal system in various ways. Firstly, 
in their modal uses they are equivalent to core modal auxiliaries and encode especially dynamic and 
epistemic meanings. We maintain that the partial decategorialization of chance allows for more fine-
grained expression of modal meanings by bringing in constructional templates that incorporate slots for 
potential premodification, as in have a good chance of V-ing. Secondly, they can express caused-modal 
meanings, in which case a causative operator is added to a basic modal meaning. Finally, structures with 
chance(s) also exceed Talmy’s (1988) greater modal system, as they can still be used lexically, which 





This chapter deals with Present-day English constructions with the noun chance(s), which is a semiotic 
noun or “shell noun”, i.e. an abstract noun that is used to “characteriz[e] and perspectiviz[e] complex 
chunks of information which are expressed in clauses or even longer stretches of text” (Schmid 2000: 
14). More specifically, it focusses on constructions in which the content of this shell noun is either 
explicitly or implicitly present in the co-text, i.e. the actual words surrounding this node, by means of a 
complement. This complement can be clausal, taking the form of an of-gerundial clause in (1) and a to-
infinitival clause in (2), or phrasal, taking the form of a prepositional phrase whose noun phrase 
complement contains an action nominal, as in (3).  
 
(1)  Having been kicked out of the Spanish Cup in the early rounds by Figueres, of the second  
 division, they now have only a mathematical chance of winning la liga, which is to say no chance 
at all. (WB, sunnow)1  
(2)  I thought you would die and I’d never get the chance to tell you I was s-s-sorry. (WB, brbooks) 
(3)  Last November’s referendum on the method of electing the president scuppered his chances for 
the job – leaving it to a future freely elected parliament to select the new head of state. (WB, 
brspok) 
 
                                                     
1 See Section 2 for more information on the Collins WordbanksOnline corpus (WB) used for this study. 
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 Looking at the etymology of this noun tells us that it was borrowed from Old French and is attested 
in English from Early Middle English onwards. The oldest meanings of chance listed in the OEDOnline 
are “[t]he falling out or happening of events; the way in which things fall out; fortune; case”; “[a]n 
opportunity that comes in any one’s way. Often const. of”; “[a] possibility or probability of anything 
happening: as distinct from a certainty: often in plural, with a number expressed.” The OED also points 
out that chance is often used in phrases, such as “[t]o stand a (fair, good) chance”; “Is there any chance 
of….?”; “[t]o be in with a chance”. Our study will show that the earliest – happenstance – meaning of 
chance is very infrequent in the data studied, and that chance is indeed found in a number of recurrent 
patterns or phrases. For a detailed account of the diachrony of constructions with chance, the reader is 
referred to Van linden (Forthc.). 
 The examples in (1) to (3) not only illustrate different types of complements found with chance, they 
also exemplify, we argue in this chapter, three distinct uses, viz. lexical, grammatical and caused-modal 
use. In (1) chance shows lexical use, in which statistical probability is at stake. In (2) I’d never get the 
chance expresses the dynamic modal meaning of participant-imposed impossibility as the I-person 
would never be able to apologize. In (3) it is said that the referendum has decreased the likelihood of 
him getting the job of president. Rather than expressing a modal meaning, this is a caused-modal use, 
in which scupper his chances adds a (semantically) negative causative operator to the basic epistemic 
meaning. On the basis of these observations, we put forward that constructions with chance(s) enrich 
the greater modal system (cf. Talmy 1988) in three ways (cf. Van linden & Brems 2017). Firstly, they 
expand the inventory of, mostly, epistemic and dynamic modal expressions, as they appear to be 
functionally equivalent to modal auxiliaries. Secondly, they also go beyond the functional reach of core 
modal auxiliaries by still allowing lexical uses, as shown in (1), which is no longer possible for the core 
modals. Thirdly, they can express ‘caused modality’ in augmented event structures that add a 
(positive/negative) causative operator as in (3). More generally, this work on constructions with 
chance(s) fits in with earlier work on the grammaticalization of constructions with semiotic nouns such 
as doubt (Davidse, De Wolf & Van linden 2015), question (Davidse & De Wolf 2012), way (Davidse et 
al. 2014), fear (Brems 2015), wonder (Gentens et al. 2016; Van linden, Davidse & Matthijs 2016) and 
need (Van linden, Davidse & Brems 2011), which combine with either complements or relative clauses 
and have been shown to have developed modal uses over time.  
 For the basic distinction between lexical and grammatical uses of constructions with chance(s) we 
use the criteria proposed by Boye & Harder (2007, 2012) in terms of primary versus secondary discourse 
status, as implemented in the studies on semiotic nouns referred to above as well. They argue that 
lexicalization and lexical status involve discourse primariness, whereas grammaticalization and 
grammatical status involve coded discourse secondariness. This will be explained in more detail in 
Section 3.  
 The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and methods used for the synchronic 
corpus study underlying this chapter. Section 3 discusses how we distinguished between the three main 
expression types observed, i.e. lexical, grammatical and caused-modal uses, drawing on Boye & 
Harder’s (2007, 2012) criteria used to tell between lexical and grammatical expressions. Comparing the 
three main uses of constructions with chance(s), we will also focus on the role of polarity in 
grammaticalization, and on reflexes of decategorialization of the noun chance in grammatical uses (cf. 
Hopper 1991). Sections 4 to 6 will then home in on the three main uses separately, providing in-depth 
qualitative and quantitative discussions of, respectively, modal, caused-modal and lexical(ized) uses. In 
these sections we will use the term ‘verbo-nominal patterns’ to refer to constructions in which chance(s) 
together with a verb brings in a complement. This can be the case in modalized grammatical uses (e.g. 
get the chance in (2)) as well as lexicalized uses in which chance is incorporated into a complex 
predicate (e.g. take a chance; see Section 6.2). Constructions in which the semiotic noun chance(s) itself 
brings in the complement will be referred to as regular uses when they are lexical (see Section 6.4). 






2. Data and methods 
 
The dataset for this chapter is drawn from the British subcorpora of Collins WordbankOnline 
(henceforth WB), excluding brregnews, i.e. British regional newspapers like the Belfast Telegraph and 
The Irish Times. More precisely, we took two random samples of 250 tokens each targeting the lemma 
chance, one from the spoken and one from the written British English subcorpora. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the specific subcorpora that were used, specifying the total number of tokens per subcorpus 
and their contents. For each of the examples given in this chapter, we will mention the subcorpus it 
comes from, using the labels in the first column. 
 
Subcorpus Total number of 
tokens 
Description 
brbooks 76,062,449 Fiction, Non-Fiction 
sunnow 51,805,654 Sun, News of the World 
times 46,759,194 Times, Sunday Times  
brmags 16,349,388 Magazines 
brnews 6,006,167 Newspapers 
brephem 4,977,155 Ephemera: Pamphlets, Brochures, 
Tickets etc. 
brspok 41,403,450 Transcribed Speech: British 
Spoken Corpus: Cobuild, BBC 
World Service 
Table 1: British subcorpora in WB used 
 
It is clear from Table 1 that for the British subcorpora the written data outweigh the spoken ones. This 
holds true for WB as a whole with written data of various kinds making up 88.88% of the corpus and 
spoken data only 11.12%.  
 The corpus query targeted the lemma chance, thus netting in both singular and plural uses of the 
noun. We manually sorted the data keeping only semiotic or shell uses of the nouns that have 
complements, which are either overtly expressed as in (4) and (6), or retrievable from the co(n)text (5): 
 
(4) They saw her entry into the war as an opportunity to pursue their own interests rather than as a 
chance to devise a new alliance strategy. (WB, brephem) 
(5) Mr Bush is being criticised for not having pursued the Iraqi leader when he had the chance. (WB, 
brspok) 
(6) If you are in debt and under stress, the chances are that your personal life is suffering. (WB, 
brbooks) 
 
In (5) the implied complement is to pursue the Iraqi leader and can be retrieved from the preceding co-
text. Complements can take the form of a to-infinitive (4), that-clause (6), of-gerundial (1), or 
preposition + action nominal (3) among others. 
 We excluded hits in which chance functions as a nominal classifier, as in a chance finding in (7) for 
instance, as well as hits in which chance was incorrectly tagged as a noun but was in fact a verb form, 
as in (8). In addition, we excluded phrases such as by chance (9). 
 




(8)  I didn’t want to chance losing my kids. (WB, brspok) 
(9)  If, by chance, anyone disagreed with this, they were executed or sent to a labour camp, under 
Joseph Stalin, or declared mentally ill and put in an asylum under Leonid Brezhnev. (WB, brspok) 
 
The remaining two sets of 250 relevant examples each were then classified into three main expression 




3. General overview: tripartite classification    
 
This section sets out to explain the criteria used to distinguish between lexical and grammatical uses of 
constructions with chance(s) based on Boye & Harder (2007, 2012), as well as the recognition criteria 
for caused-modal uses, comparing also the frequencies of these three uses in the corpus data. In addition, 
it will concentrate on two aspects of grammaticalization discussed in the literature, i.e. the role of 
negative polarity as a trigger for the development of modal meaning, and effects of decategorialization 
The grammatical uses of constructions with chance(s) concern the expression of modal meanings, 
mostly dynamic and epistemic, with the possibility of the former getting a deontic inference, and some 
examples being vague between dynamic and epistemic meanings (see Section 4).   
 For the distinction between lexical and grammatical uses, we used the criteria proposed by Boye & 
Harder (2007, 2012) in terms of primary versus secondary discourse status. They argue that 
lexicalization and lexical status involve discourse primariness, whereas grammaticalization and 
grammatical status involve coded discourse secondariness. “Grammar is constituted by expressions that 
by linguistic convention are ancillary and as such discursively secondary in relation to other 
expressions” (Boye & Harder 2012: 2). As opposed to lexical expressions, grammatical ones, such as 
modal auxiliaries, are “noncarriers of the main point serving instead an ancillary communicative purpose 
as secondary or backgrounded elements” (Boye & Harder 2012: 6-7). In keeping with Davidse, De Wolf 
& Van linden (2015: 26), we argue that because of their discourse primariness lexical uses of chance(s) 
are inherently “addressable” (Boye & Harder 2007: 581–585; 2012: 7–8) for instance by means of tags, 
really-queries and yes/no-questions as shown in (10a)-(10c) respectively. Example (4) from Section 2 
is repeated here as (10): 
 
(10)  They saw her entry into the war as an opportunity to pursue their own interests rather than as 
a chance to devise a new alliance strategy. (WB, brephem)  
(10a) It was a chance to devise a new allegiance, wasn’t it? 
(10b) It was a chance to devise a new allegiance strategy. — Really? 
(10c) Was it a chance to devise a new allegiance strategy? 
 
In (10) the notion of chance is discourse primary as it is the main point of the communication to see 
whether something should be qualified as an opportunity or a chance. Obviously, the co-text is very 
important in this analysis. 
 By contrast The chances are in (11), which repeats (6), is secondary in the discourse compared to 
the proposition it modifies. It cannot be queried by a yes/no-question, nor tagged, as shown in (11a) to 
(11c): 
 
(11)  If you are in debt and under stress, the chances are that your personal life is suffering. (WB, 
brbooks) 
(11a)  Are the chances that your personal life is suffering? 
(11b)  ?The chances are that your personal life is suffering. — Really? 




In (11) the chances are modifies the following lexical content, which is the main point of the 
communication, by assessing the likelihood with which it will occur (see Section 4 on modalized 
expressions). In (11b) the query by means of really? is as such not impossible, but it is important to note 
that it does not target the matrix with chances are, but rather the contents of the complement clause: 
would your personal life really be suffering in these circumstances?  
 It should be noted that the distinction between lexical and grammatical use is not always clear-cut. 
That is, some cases had better be analysed as bridging contexts (Evans and Wilkins 2000: 550), i.e. 
examples that contextually support both a lexical and a grammatical reading. A case in point is (12).   
 
(12)  We gave it everything we had but it was not quite enough. We had a chance to win it but there 
are no excuses. (WB, times) 
 
In a lexical reading, the chance referred to in (12) refers to the football players having a chance to score 
the winning goal, and this is the most important information. In a grammatical reading, chance refers 
more generally to the whole game offering the opportunity to win and the sentence is interpreted as the 
speaker assessing, in hindsight, that their team could have won (epistemic judgement), or the speaker 
indicating that their team had the capacities to win (dynamic expression), but unfortunately did not 
succeed. For a more detailed discussion of these modal notions, the reader is referred to Section 4. As 
indicated in Table 2 below, bridging contexts are very infrequent in our datasets, and will hence not be 
discussed in further detail.    
 The third main type of use we distinguish in this chapter is that of caused-modal uses, as in (13) (cf. 
Van linden & Brems 2017): 
 
(13)  Chairman John Yorkston has admitted Richard Gough’s plan to draft in Archie Knox as his 
right-hand man has boosted his chances of being Pars gaffer. (WB, sunnow) 
 
In these patterns a (positive or negative) causative operator is added to a basic modal meaning. In (13) 
Richard Gough’s plan to draft in Archie Know as his right-hand man makes it more likely that he will 
become the manager of Dunfermline Athletic Football Club (or “Pars gaffer”). Rather than epistemically 
assessing the likelihood of the propositional content coded in the complement, as in (11), examples like 
(13) make a statement on how to increase the likelihood of something. As will be explained in greater 
detail in Section 5, we do not consider caused-modal uses to be grammatical proper.  
 Table 2 below presents the quantitative instantiation of the three main expression types in the spoken 
and written datasets studied, which will be discussed in more detail in Sections 4 to 6 below. In addition 
to describing the semantic and discursive features of structures with chance, these sections will also look 
for correlations of the three expression types with specific constructional properties, such as the presence 
of a larger unit chance takes part in (e.g. have a chance), the formal type of complement, and 
modification of the noun chance, as well as polarity value preferences.  
 
OVERVIEW Spoken Written Total 
n % n % n % 
Modal 117 46.80 87 34.80 204 40.80 
Caused-modal 41 16.40 54 21.60 95 19.00 
Lexical(ized) 90 36.00 108 43.20 198 39.60 
Bridging modal/lexical 2 0.80 1 0.40 3 0.60 
Total 250 100.00 250 100.00 500 100.00 




Table 2 shows that there are more modal uses in the spoken data. In fact, Fisher’s exact tests indicate 
that the share of modal uses is significantly larger in the spoken dataset compared to the written data 
(p=.008). This might indicate that the grammaticalization of chance(s) in spoken language precedes 
changes in the written mode. This is in keeping with Halliday (1978), Chafe (2003) and Du Bois (2003), 
who have all singled out casual conversational language as an important locus of language change and 
innovation because it is less subject to overly conscious forms of monitoring or engineering. The shares 
of caused-modal and lexical(ized) uses do not differ significantly across the two language modes 
studied. Whenever the mode variable is found not to reach statistical significance, the findings for the 
two datasets will be conflated in a single table in Sections 4 to 6. 
 We now turn to the role of polarity in the development of grammatical meanings in patterns with 
chance. Whereas previous research on other semiotic nouns has shown that negative polarity is often an 
important trigger for their grammaticalization (see among others Davidse et al. 2014 on no way; Davidse 
& De Wolf 2012 on no question; Davidse, De Wolf & Van linden 2015 on no doubt; and Van linden, 
Davidse & Matthijs 2016 on no wonder), this seems far less the case for constructions with chance(s). 
Table 3 shows the percentages of the three main uses related to polarity. 
 
Spoken Positive polarity Negative polarity Total 
n % n % n % 
Modal 81 69.23 36 30.77 117 100.00 
Caused-modal 35 85.37 6 14.63 41 100.00 
Lexical(ized) 69 76.67 21 23.33 90 100.00 
Bridging modal/lexical 0 0.00 2 100.00 2 100.00 
Total 185 74.00 65 26.00 250 100.00 
Table 3: Polarity values among types of uses of chance in spoken UK English 
 
Written Positive polarity Negative polarity Total 
n % n % n % 
Modal 64 73.56 23 26.44 87 100.00 
Caused-modal 44 81.48 10 18.52 54 100.00 
Lexical(ized) 94 87.04 14 12.96 108 100.00 
Bridging modal/lexical 1 100.00 0 0 1 100.00 
Total 203 81.20 47 18.80 250 100.00 
Table 4: Polarity values among types of uses of chance in written UK English 
 
If we first compare Tables 3 and 4, we see that the shares of positive and negative polarity do not differ 
so much across the two datasets studied. This is validated by a Fisher’s exact test; the p-value does not 
reach the .05 level of significance (p=.06). If we then home in on the difference in polarity preferences 
between the basic uses, we find that – if we disregard the infrequent bridging contexts – modal uses 
show significantly higher rates of negative polarity than lexical(ized) and caused-modal uses (Fisher’s 
exact p=. 004 for spoken and written data together). Yet, compared to other semiotic nouns such as 
wonder, doubt and way, the association between negative polarity and grammatical meaning is far 
weaker in the case of chance. Van linden (Forthc) shows that this observation holds for the diachronic 
development of constructions with chance as well.   
 A second aspect of grammaticalization we consider relevant to our corpus study is one that has 
received considerable attention in grammaticalization research, also beyond the study of semiotic nouns 
in English, i.e. Hopper’s (1991) principle of decategorialization. This principle measures the ‘degree’ 
of grammaticality or grammaticalization of an item or construction; it refers to the fact that as a noun or 
lexical verb grammaticalizes they typically lose (some of) the morphological properties associated with 
their original lexical category. For countable nouns this concerns the singular/plural contrast, but also 
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the possibility to be premodified by adjectives. The principle hence predicts that in its lexical use 
chance(s) still acts as a real noun that can be modified by adjectives and can appear in the singular and 
plural form. This is motivated by the categoriality principle (Hopper & Thompson 1984), which states 
that categories, i.e. word classes, should be related to their basic discourse functions. In this view, nouns 
are viewed as the prototypical instantiation of the basic discourse functions of identifying referents and 
their morphosyntactic properties are attributable to these functions. As we will see in Sections 6.1 to 
6.4, lexical uses do indeed appear quite easily with a variety of adjectives and we also find singular 
count, plural count as well as uncount uses of chance.  
 As will be argued in Section 4, the premodifying adjectives that appear in grammatical uses are 
restricted to degree modifiers such as better, good and fair. They are compatible with and can be said to 
further reinforce the modal value expressed rather than attest to chance still being a noun and hence 
lexical in nature (cf. Davidse & Van linden 2019). Figure 1 shows that in the three main uses 
distinguished here chance is premodified in less than 30% of the cases. This figure includes data from 
both datasets studied, as the shares of examples showing premodification do not differ significantly 
across spoken and written mode (Fisher’s exact p=.6). Interestingly, our data show that modalized 
expressions may very well show premodification of chance; the difference in frequency with 
lexical(ized) uses is not statistically significant (Fisher’s exact p=.1). It will be shown in Sections 4 to 6 
that it is not the frequency of premodification that matters in relation to the type of use, but rather the 
semantic nature of the premodifiers.   
 
Figure 1: Premodification of chance across the basic uses in spoken and written UK English 
 
Similarly, in the context of the grammaticalization of size noun expressions such as a lot of and a bunch 
of, Brems (2011: 194-201) showed that both lexical uses and grammatical quantifier uses occur with 
premodifying adjectives, seemingly undermining decategorialization and grammaticalization claims. 
However, the premodification patterns differ systematically and are reduced to degree modifiers like 
whole for quantifier uses, whereas lexical uses appear with all kinds of premodification. It was argued 
that this partial decategorialization displayed by quantifier uses does not detract from their being 
grammatical and that this potential for restricted premodification actually enriches the quantifier 
paradigm. In almost the same vein, Brems (2011: 191) argued that plural size noun quantifiers such as 
lots of and heaps of have lost their true plural meaning and instead reinforce the grammatical quantifier 
semantics. This also goes for chance and chances, which refer to a single chance and more than one 
chance respectively in their lexical use, whereas in their grammatical uses this functional contrast is lost. 
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In sum, we argue that modal constructions with chance and chances do show at least partial 
decategorialization, which seems in keeping with the idea of ongoing grammaticalization processes.  
 
 
4. Modalized expressions  
 
In the first type of constructions to be dealt with in more detail, chance(s) is used in modalized 
expressions which convey basically dynamic or epistemic meaning, or which are vague between these 
two meanings, as discussed in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 will show that these expressions show less variety 
in terms of constructional properties than the caused-modal and lexical(ized) ones discussed in Sections 
5 and 6. 
 
4.1 Types of modal meaning 
 
Patterns with chance are found to express different modal notions in the Present-day English data 
studied; Table 5 details the quantitative instantiation of these in the spoken and written datasets. It is 
clear that the different types of modal notions take up similar shares across the two mode types studied; 
Fisher’s exact tests confirm there are no statistically significant differences between the two types for 
any modal notion. We can see that epistemic and dynamic modality account for equal shares of about 
40%. 
 
Modalized expressions Spoken Written Total 
n % n % n % 
Dynamic 49 41.88 36 41.38 85 41.67 
Dynamic + deontic 6 5.13 2 2.30 8 3.92 
Dynamic/epistemic 14 11.97 12 13.79 26 12.75 
Epistemic 44 37.61 36 41.38 80 39.22 
Epistemic + volitional 3 2.56 1 1.15 4 1.96 
Epistemic/polar 1 0.85 0 0.00 1 0.49 
TOTAL 117 100.00 87 100.00 204 100.00 
Table 5: The types of modal meanings expressed by structures with chance 
 
 Epistemic modality has been defined as involving the speaker’s (or someone else’s) assessment of a 
propositional content in terms of likelihood. Epistemic expressions thus convey the degree of probability 
of a specific propositional content, as assessed by a modal source (cf. Palmer 1979: ch. 3, 2001: 24–35; 
Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca 1994: 179–180; Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 81; Nuyts 2006: 6). 
An example with chance is given in (14). 
 
(14)  It [i.e. NATO] has spoken of extending the hand of friendship to the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. It has declared that it’ll take account of legitimate Soviet security worries. And there’s 
every chance the NATO summit will unveil a revised military strategy for the Alliance. (WB, 
brspok) 
 
In (14), chance is found in the verbo-nominal pattern (VNP) there BE (det) CHANCE,2 and the utterance 
can be paraphrased as ‘the NATO summit will most likely unveil a revised military strategy for the 
Alliance.’ The speaker thus uses the pattern with chance to give their assessment of the future NATO 
summit unveiling a revised military strategy for the Alliance in terms of likelihood. Note that the 
                                                     
2 In the rendering of matrix patterns, (det) stands for (determiner). 
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meaning of (high degree of) probability is not the main point of uttering (14); epistemic assessments are 
always ancillary to the propositional content they apply to. 
 In a few cases (2%, see Table 5), we found epistemic meanings with an implicature of volitionality. 
In (15), for example, the speaker not only estimates the occurrence of Stevie going in January as 
impossible, they also imply that they do not want that to happen. This implicature very much hinges on 
the ensuing co-text, which explicitly refers to the club’s intentions. In our data, it is restricted to 
constructions showing negative polarity. 
 
(15) But chief executive Rick Parry is backing boss Rafael Benitez to lead a drive for honours that 
will convince local boy Gerrard to stay with the club he has supported since he was a boy. 
Parry said: “There is no chance of Stevie going in January. That just won’t happen. Our 
intention is that we will never let him go.” (WB, sunnow)  
 
 One example presents a special case of negative polarity construction in which no chance is not 
incorporated in a larger unit, and is used as an anaphoric adverbial which serves as a response to a 
preceding speech act, cf. (16).  
 
(16) “But so are you two You two will get together” —  “Oh yes” —  “and you’ll say Right I want 
this and he’ll say No chance.” —  “No chance. We can’t do it. That’s it.” (WB, brspok) 
 
No chance thus functions as an emphatic variant to the negative response item no (cf. Huddleston & 
Pullum 2002: 849; Brems & Van linden 2018; Van linden forthc.). Uses like in (16) express the same 
basic meaning of epistemic impossibility; they are termed ‘epistemic/polar’ in Table 5 and account for 
a mere 0.50%.  
 In addition to epistemic modality, modalized structures with chance are found to express dynamic 
meaning in over 40% of the cases (see Table 5). Whereas the definition of epistemic modality given 
above is fairly uncontroversial, the category of dynamic modality is not generally recognized; for 
example, it is conflated with deontic modality in the two-way classification between root and epistemic 
modality (e.g. Coates 1983; Sweetser 1990). In those accounts that do include it as a separate basic 
modal category, it has received both narrow and broad definitions. The traditional definition is a narrow 
one, involving the ascription of an ability or capacity to the subject participant of a clause, as in Jones 
can speak Spanish (see von Wright 1951: 28; see Depraetere and Reed [2006: 281–282] for an overview 
of the relevant literature). In a broader, more recent definition, dynamic modality is taken to apply to all 
indications of abilities/possibilities, or needs/necessities inherent in agents or, more generally, 
participants of actions (which are not necessarily syntactic subjects) or in situations (Palmer 1979: 3–4, 
ch. 5–6, 1990: ch. 5–6; Perkins 1983: 11–12; Nuyts 2006; Van linden 2012: 12–16). What is common 
to both definitions is that this type of modality does not involve an attitudinal assessment (e.g. of the 
speaker); rather, the abilities/possibilities or needs/necessities are indicated on the basis of grounds that 
are internal to (the participants in) the situation. This chapter adopts the broader definition, which applies 
in (17).   
 
(17)  “It’s great for us,” Richardson said. “It’s been well documented that the club’s struggling for 
cash and I’m just pleased we’ve got the chance to test ourselves against Premiership opponents 
here.” (WB, times) 
 
In (17), the opportunity for the club to test themselves against Premiership opponents certainly does not 
reside in the physical abilities of the players, but rather in the external circumstances – or the context of 
the utterance – that is, decisions on the calendar of the soccer season. The VNP HAVE (GOT) (det) 
CHANCE can here be paraphrased by the semi-modal be able to: ‘I’m just pleased we’re able to test 
ourselves against Premiership opponents here.’   
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 In about 13% of the cases (see Table 5), chance occurs in VNPs that are vague between epistemic 
and dynamic meanings. Semantically vague examples are different from bridging context, which 
involve semantic ambiguity (see Section 3 above), in that they involve “two or more semantic features 
simultaneously playing a role in the interpretation of a structure: grasping the meaning of such a structure 
involves incorporating two or more different semantic features into one global interpretation” (Willemse 
2007: 562). The relevant cases here could be interpreted epistemically and dynamically at once. Example 
(18) is a case in point.  
 
(18)  He knew he was being followed. Since he was quite unable to run he had no chance of 
outstripping his pursuer, so he resigned himself to imminent recapture. (WB, brbooks) 
 
In (18), the same paraphrase proposed for (17) works (‘he was not able to outstrip his pursuer’), but at 
the same time another paraphrase with the semi-modal be likely to also seems to adequately capture the 
meaning of HAVE (det) CHANCE here: ‘he was unlikely to outstrip his pursuer.’ 
 Finally, there are a small number of cases in which the basic modal meaning is dynamic, but in which 
the co-text triggers an additional deontic implicature (about 4 % in Table 5). Deontic modality has 
traditionally been associated with the notions of permission and obligation (e.g. von Wright 1951: 36; 
Lyons 1977: 823–841; Kratzer 1978: 111; Van der Auwera and Plungian 1998: 81). While more recent 
approaches have argued to restrict the category to purely conceptual meanings related to the desirability 
of a situation, i.e. an attitudinal assessment on the basis of SoA-external grounds (Nuyts et al. 2010; Van 
linden & Verstraete 2011), this chapter will include directive notions like obligation and permission 
under the label of deontic modality. It is the latter notion that is strongly implied in example (19) below, 
especially because of its preceding co-text. 
 
(19)  “What about erm do you think while you were at school there was anything that you weren’t 
allowed to do because you were a girl?”  —  “Mm. as well we had the chance to play football 
and we had a”  —  “Oh right” —  “girls’ football team and er it was really good.” (WB, ukspok) 
 
In (19), the pattern with chance indicates what the girls were able to do within the circumstances at 
school (they had the opportunity to play football), but because the preceding question explicitly asks 
about instances of absence of permission, a directive-deontic notion, the pattern HAVE (det) CHANCE 
here also comes to imply the notion of permission. Note that the speaker reports here on the existence 
of permission; they do not grant this permission themselves. That is, we are dealing here with objective 
deontic modality rather than subjective deontic modality (cf. Verstraete 2001). 
 
4.2 Constructional properties 
 
Interestingly, the data indicate that the types of modal notions expressed by verbo-nominal patterns with 
chance discussed above correlate with certain constructional characteristics, such as the type of VNP 
(or matrix construction), the formal types of complement, polarity value preferences, and types of 
premodifiers. As the spoken and written datasets did not show statistically significant differences in 
terms of the distribution of modal notions (Table 5), the tables in this section conflate the two datasets, 
with a total of 204 examples. 
 A first observation is that the 204 examples are realized by just five VNPs, which differ in terms of 
specialization for modal subtype, as evident from Table 6. The pattern (the) CHANCES are, for example, 
is used in epistemic expressions only, whereas GET (det) CHANCE is restricted to dynamic expressions 
(with or without deontic inference). The most frequent patterns, HAVE (GOT) (det) CHANCE and there 
BE/SEEM (det) CHANCE are also the most versatile ones. In addition to five VNPs, the string no CHANCE 
is also attested without a verb and without overt complement in expressions that combine epistemic 













(the) CHANCES are — — — 11 — — 11 
GET (det) CHANCE 12 3 — — — — 15 
HAVE (GOT) (det) 
CHANCE 
69 3 20 18 — — 110 
STAND (det) 
CHANCE 
1 — 2 4 — — 7 
there BE/SEEM (det) 
CHANCE 
3 2 3 47 2 — 57 
no CHANCE — — 1 — 2 1 4 
Total 85 8 26 80 4 1 204 
Table 6: VNPs of modalized expressions with chance in spoken and written UK English 
 
 If we now turn to the formal types of complement found for each modal notion expressed, as detailed 
in Table 7, we can draw conclusions similar to those on the distribution of VNPs across modal subtypes. 
That-clauses specialize in epistemic expressions, while to-infinitives are restricted to expressions that 
are (at least) dynamic in meaning. More versatile complement types include of-gerundial clauses and 
of-prepositional phrases whose noun phrase complement refers to an event or a propositional content. 
In about 7% of the cases and across many modal meanings, the complement is not overtly expressed, 



















Dynamic — 66 9 2 1 — 7 85 
Dynamic + deontic — 6 1 1 — — — 8 
Dynamic/epistemic — 4 17 2 — — 3 26 
Epistemic 34 — 26 18 — 1 1 80 
Epistemic + 
volitional 
— — 1 1 — — 2 4 
Epistemic/polar — — — — — — 1 1 
TOTAL 34 76 55 24 1 1 14 204 
Table 7: Types of complements in modalized VPNs with chance in spoken and written UK English 
 
 Furthermore, the data point to two correlations between modal subtype and polarity value of the 
modalized expressions with chance, i.e. the two least frequent modal notions only occur in negative 
polarity contexts, cf. Table 8. In the case of epistemic + volitional uses (e.g. (15) above), the combination 
with negative polarity is statistically significant (Fisher’s exact p=.006) compared with other modal 
subtypes. All the other types of modal meanings occur far more frequently (about 73%) in positive than 
in negative polarity contexts. 
Finally, as referred to in Section 3 above, the premodifiers found with chance in modalized 
expressions convey quantification or degree modification of the overall modal meaning expressed (cf. 
Davidse & Van linden 2019 on wonder). Frequent examples include the indefinite quantifiers little and 






Modalized expressions Positive polarity Negative polarity Total 
n % n % n % 
Dynamic 62 72.94 23 27.06 85 100.00 
Dynamic + deontic 7 87.50 1 12.50 8 100.00 
Dynamic/epistemic 17 65.38 9 34.62 26 100.00 
Epistemic 59 73.75 21 26.25 80 100.00 
Epistemic + volitional 0 0.00 4 100.00 4 100.00 
Epistemic/polar 0 0.00 1 100.00 1 100.00 
TOTAL 145 71.08 59 28.92 204 100.00 
Table 8: Polarity values in modalized expressions with chance in spoken and written UK English 
 
  
5. Expressions of caused modality  
 
While patterns with chance are found to be polysemous in the modal domain, expressing a wide range 
of grammatical, qualificational meanings similarly to English modal auxiliaries (Section 4), they also 
exceed the functional range of the modal auxiliaries in that they are found in what we call “caused 
modality” constructions (cf. Van linden & Brems 2017). Again, we can distinguish a number of semantic 
subtypes within this use, which will be discussed in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we will home in on the 
constructional properties of the types of caused-modal uses found. 
 
5.1 Chance and Talmy’s greater modal system 
 
The category of “caused modality” constructions has been recently proposed by Van linden & Brems 
(2017) to refer to constructions which add a causative operator to a basic modal meaning. An example 
is given in (20).  
 
(20)  The Welsh star [i.e. Ryan Giggs] added: “When I get the children to Manchester, I’d like them 
to meet all the United lads – it’ll give the kids a chance to touch people they’d only before 
seen on TV.” (WB, sunnow) 
 
The pattern GIVE (det) CHANCE in (20) shows an augmented event structure compared to dynamic 
utterances like (17) above, in that an additional Causer participant has been added. This is clear from 
the corresponding paraphrase ‘it [i.e. meeting Giggs’ teammates from Manchester United] will make it 
possible for the kids to touch people they’d only before seen on TV’. The subtype illustrated in (20) is 
termed caused-dynamic meaning. Table 9 indicates the different subtypes of caused-modal meanings 
attested in the corpus. Fisher’s exact tests point out that there are no statistically significant differences 
between the spoken and written datasets for any subtype. Caused-dynamic expressions like (20) above 
chalk up about 50% of the caused-modal uses. 
 
Caused modality Spoken Written Total 
n % n % n % 
Caused-dynamic 18 43.90 29 53.70 47 49.47 
Caused-dynamic + deontic 15 36.59 13 24.07 28 29.47 
Caused-epistemic 8 19.51 12 22.22 20 21.05 
Total 41 100.00 54 100.00 95 100.00 




 Second most frequent are examples like (21) below, in which a basic caused-dynamic meaning is 
overlaid with a deontic implicature (about 30%, see Table 9). Example (21) could thus be regarded as 
similar to the non-caused example (19) above, to which a causative operator has been added: ‘Voting is 
due to start on Friday afternoon to allow people to cast their ballots before they head off to the country 
for the weekend.’ 
 
(21)  Voting is due to start on Friday afternoon to give people the chance to cast their ballots before 
they head off to the country for the weekend, which is common here. (WB, ukspok) 
 
 We are of course not the first ones to note semantic affinity between modal and causative expressions. 
In fact, the patterns we found with chance offer support for – and onomasiologically enrich – Talmy’s 
(1988: 80–81) “greater modal system”, which is part of his (then proposed) semantic category of force 
dynamics. This category is concerned with “how entities interact with force” (1988: 49); the main force-
dynamic (semantic) roles include the Agonist, i.e. the focal force entity, and the Antagonist, i.e. the force 
entity that opposes the Agonist (1988: 53). The greater modal system includes regular-verb members 
(the causative verbs make/let/have/help) as well as modal auxiliaries (or modal idioms like had better), 
as in the second and first line in (22) respectively. 
 
(22)  He can/may/must/should/would not/need not/dare not/had better 
I made him/let him/had him/helped (him) 
–push the car to the garage. (Talmy 1988: 81, ex. (33)) 
 
Talmy (1988: 81) argues that the members of this system share the same syntactic properties, as they all 
combine with bare infinitives, and the same semantic properties, as they all have force-dynamic 
reference. However, the members fall into two groups in terms of which force-dynamic participant is 
mapped onto the subject function: causative verbs code the Antagonist as subject, while modals code 
the Agonist as subject. This difference amounts to a difference in verb argument structure, in which 
causative structures have an additional syntactic slot for the Causer participant (Antagonist in Talmy’s 
terms) compared to structures with modal auxiliaries. The same relation holds between the caused-modal 
structures with chance in (20) and (21) compared to the modalized structures in (17) and (19) above. 
Expressions with chance thus evidence the conceptual connection between basic modal and caused-
modal meanings that is at the basis of Talmy’s (1988) greater modal system. 
 In addition to caused-dynamic structures, with or without deontic implicature, we also found patterns 
with chance that we propose to analyse as caused-epistemic, which – in our understanding – is not 
included in Talmy (1988). They account for about 20% of the caused modality constructions. Examples 
are given in (23) and (24).  
 
(23)  The mayor has expressed concern that anti-English feeling in the city [i.e. Turin], aroused by 
the Heysel stadium tragedy five years ago, could greatly increase the chances of violent 
disorder. (…) The majority of the thirty-five Italians who died at Heysel were Juventus 
supporters from Turin. (WB, brspok) 
 
(24)  Having now sampled what Scottish life has to offer, the player is keen to stay for longer – but 
fears a dispute over a transfer fee might scupper any chance he has of making the move 
permanent. (WB, brbooks) 
 
In (23), the mayor of Turin is concerned that anti-English feeling could make violent disorder more 
likely, and in (24), a dispute over a transfer fee might make it unlikely that football player McKenna’s 
move from Cottbus to Edinburgh – initially on loan – becomes permanent. Note that (24) is 




5.2 Constructional properties 
 
In terms of constructional characteristics, caused-modal expressions with chance differ most notably 
from modalized expressions in that they show a lexically varied set of verbs with more specific meanings 
than the verbo-nominal patterns surveyed in Table 6 above. Other properties to be dealt with in this 
section include the formal types of complement, polarity value preference and prenominal modification. 
As the spoken and written datasets for caused-modal uses did not show statistically significant 
differences (cf. Section 5.1, Table 9), the tables in this section again put the two datasets together, 
totalling 95 examples. 
 Let us start with the verbo-nominal patterns found in caused-modal expressions, which are presented 
in Table 10. Comparing this table to Table 6 above, it is clear that far fewer tokens (95 vs. 204) occur 
in far more matrix types (23 vs. 5 or 6), and that the verbs carry more specific semantics. Caused-modal 
expressions thus show far greater lexical variability than modalized utterances. This lexical specificity, 









ALLOW X (det) CHANCE — 2 — 2 
BOOST (det) CHANCES — — 1 1 
COST X (det) CHANCE 2 — — 2 
DENY X (det) CHANCE 1 1 — 2 
DILUTE (det) CHANCES — — 1 1 
ENHANCE X’s CHANCES — — 1 1 
GET (det) CHANCE 2 2 — 4 
GIVE X (det) CHANCE 31 18 3 52 
HEIGHTEN (det) CHANCES — — 1 1 
IMPROVE (det) CHANCES — — 3 3 
INCREASE X’s CHANCES — — 3 3 
JEOPARDIZE (det) CHANCES 1 — — 1 
KEEP UP (det) CHANCES — — 1 1 
MINIMIZE (det) CHANCES — — 1 1 
OFFER X (det) CHANCE 7 3 — 10 
PROVIDE X with (det) CHANCE 1 — — 1 
QUASH (det) CHANCE — 1 — 1 
RAISE (det) CHANCE — — 1 1 
REDUCE (det) CHANCE — — 2 2 
REMOVE (det) CHANCE 1 — — 1 
SCUPPER (det) CHANCE — — 2 2 
STRANGLE (det) CHANCE — 1 — 1 
WRECK (det) CHANCES 1 — — 1 
Total 47 28 20 95 
Table 10: VNPs of caused-modal expressions with chance in spoken and written UK English 
 
Another observation regarding the VNPs in Table 10 is that they divide in semantically positive (e.g. 
allow, boost, increase, raise) and semantically negative items (e.g. cost, deny, dilute, scupper, wreck), 
for each of the three semantic subtypes. 
 Moving on to grammatical polarity, we can observe that caused-modal expressions predominantly 
occur in positive polarity contexts (83%), as shown in Table 11. The differences between the semantic 
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types of caused modality are not statistically significant, with Fisher’s exact p-values ranging between 
p=.3 and p=1. 
 
Caused modality Positive polarity Negative polarity Total 
n % n % n % 
Caused-dynamic 41 87.23 6 12.77 47 100.00 
Caused-dynamic + 
deontic 
23 82.14 5 17.86 28 100.00 
Caused-epistemic 15 75.00 5 25.00 20 100.00 
Total 79 83.16 16 16.84 95 100.00 
Table 11: Polarity values in caused-modal expressions with chance in spoken and written UK English 
 
 In terms of formal types of complement, detailed in Table 12, the caused-modal expressions are 
similar to the modalized ones in that they combine with clausal complements in more than 80% of the 
cases, but they differ in that they do not pattern with that-clauses, which account for 16.5% of the 
modalized expressions (see Table 7 above). While caused-dynamic expressions clearly favour to-
infinitival complements (as do dynamically modal expressions, cf. Table 7), caused-epistemic 

















35 6 3 1 2 47 
Caused-epistemic — 1 15 3 1 0 20 
TOTAL 0 59 23 7 2 4 95 
Table 12: Types of complements in caused-modal VNPs with chance in spoken and written UK 
English 
 
 The last constructional property to be looked at is prenominal modification. Figure 1 in Section 3 
indicated that among the three main types of uses, caused modality features the lowest share of 
premodifiers (10.5%). If we take a closer look at the semantics of these premodifying elements, we find 
not only quantifiers (little, more) and evaluative adjectives expressing degree modification (great, fair, 
best), just like we recorded for modalized expressions, but also ordinal numbers (second) and nominal 
classifiers (long-term), which cannot serve the purposes of quantification or degree modification. These 
findings on the premodification of chance thus constitute another ground on which we do not regard 
caused modality as a purely grammatical category. 
 
 
6. Lexical(ized) expressions  
 
As explained in Section 3, in lexical uses chance and chances are considered to be discourse-primary, 
i.e. the main point of the communication. The co-text in these uses makes it clear that these nouns refer 
to specific events or things that can be considered to constitute an opportunity or a coincidence. In 
Sections 6.1 to 6.4 we distinguish between subtypes of lexical uses in terms of the constructional 
template they occur in. Although lexical(ized) uses take up about 40% of the data analysed (see Table 2 
in Section 3), they are treated here with far less quantitative detail as the other two main uses in the 




6.1 Lexical uses: chance is discourse-primary 
 
We first focus on uses in which chance(s) is discourse-primary and combines with a limited set of light 
verbs like have and be. Interestingly, as we have seen in Section 4, the constructional template with have 
can also accommodate modal uses in which chance(s) is discourse-secondary. In examples (25) to (27), 
however, the co-text makes clear that we are dealing with discourse-primary uses. Note that the template 
with be is different from those in modalized expressions, as it involves predicative structures with fully 
referential subjects (cf. (26)-(27)), while the latter involve existential structures (cf. (the) CHANCES are; 
there BE (det) CHANCE in Table 6). 
 
(25)  Mackie was the goal hero again in 70 minutes when Quino, Hart and Culkin got in a tangle 
and the Dons youngster pounced to poke the ball through the keeper’s legs. The Dons twice 
had good chances to grab a dramatic late winner. (WB, sunnow) 
(26)  Britney is constantly looking for more grown-up pop and that is exactly what Natasha 
manages. “It is also a brilliant chance for Natasha to raise her profile in America.” (WB, 
sunnow) 
(27)  Nicola Chenery, 33, hopes to conceive by the end of the year using a controversial technique 
not usually available in Britain. She and partner Mike Smith, 52, from Plymouth, have saved 
£6,000 for gender selection IVF treatment. (…) Nicola said yesterday: “Ever since I was a 
child I dreamed one day I would be a mum with a daughter. I love my four boys, but this could 
be my last chance to have a baby girl.” (WB, sunnow) 
 
Example (25) refers to two real chances to score a goal in the context of a football match. In (26) 
American popstar Britney Spears contacting the British singer Natasha Bedingfield to write songs for 
her offers the latter an exceptional opportunity to raise her profile in America. In (27) an expensive and 
controversial IVF treatment abroad is seen as the last opportunity Nicola Chenery has to have a daughter. 
In examples (25) to (27) chance(s) is premodified by adjectives that further qualify or evaluate the 
opportunities, for instance in terms of how realistic or brilliant they are, as in (25) and (26) or whether 
it is seen as the final one (27). 
 
6.2 Lexicalized uses: chance in complex predicates 
 
Chance or chances can also combine with a limited set of lexically full verbs including take to form a 
complex predicate that allows for a paraphrase involving the verb to risk, as in (28). 
 
(28)  They gave the bands dressing rooms at opposite ends of the backstage area. A spokesman said: 
“We didn’t want any punch-ups and took no chances on Liam and James coming face to face.” 
(WB, sunnow) 
 
In (28) the T in the Park organisers do not want to risk any kind of bust-up between the British bands 
Oasis and Starsailor and therefore give them dressing rooms at opposite ends of the backstage area. 
 
6.3 Lexical uses: chance meaning ‘coincidence’ 
 
In just two cases, chance has the specific happenstance meaning of ‘coincidence’. These cases show the 
template it BE (det) CHANCE + that-clause, i.e. extraposition constructions3 with anticipatory subject it 
that refers to a specific situation (coded in a that-clause) as being a coincidence or not. Remarkably, in 
                                                     




(29), negative It is no chance gets a mirative overtone and expresses that the content of the complement 
clause is unsurprising (Delancy 2001: 369; Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007: 37; Gentens et al. 
2016). Van linden, Davidse & Matthijs (2016) have argued that mirative uses of no wonder typically 
work within a discourse schema involving a mirative marker (i.e. no wonder), a proposition that is 
assessed miratively, and a justification motivating this assessment. In (29) too we see that the fact that 
Shakespeare owned a legal textbook, rather than another type of textbook, is assessed as unsurprising 
given that he was litigious throughout his life. 
 
(29) Will Shakspere [sic] was indeed leapingly ambitious and determined. He was startlingly 
confident of his own abilities (as Nashe tells us) and had a greedy eye for gold. It is no chance 
that the book bearing his Westminster address is a legal textbook -- Will was to prove litigious 
and acquisitive throughout his life. (WB, brbooks) 
 
In the other case (30), there is no such mirative overtone; it’s just like chance points out that it is purely 
coincidental, and not on purpose, that two people happened to buy similar boots. 
 
(30)  that I I got for Christmas a nice pair of boots and then erm I I She didn’t see them and then er 
she went out and bought herself a pair of boots and they were very similar. So sometimes it’s 
just like chance that we wear Mm. Mm. the same things. (WB, brspok) 
 
6.4 Regular uses 
 
What we call ‘regular uses’ of chance(s) include structures in which chance(s) does not form a larger 
unit with a verb in the way it does in all the examples discussed so far (apart from the adverbial use in 
Section 4). That is, in regular uses, it is the noun chance(s) itself that brings in the complement, rather 
than the combination of chance(s) + verb. Regular uses display a lot of variety in terms of their 
constructional make-up. Chance(s) and its complement can for instance be the direct object of the main 
verb (31) or the subject of a clause, as in (32) and (34). Example (33) is similar to the existential 
construction There is an eighty per cent chance of a shower. 
 
(31)  Lydia Syson of the BBC assesses the chances of success of this new populist approach to 
Canada’s perennial problem. (WB, brspok) 
(32)  Nina Blair, however, appeared to be deteriorating and her condition was critical; the chances 
of  her survival were said to be minimal. (WB, brnews) 
(33)  At the moment we’re talking an eighty per cent chance of a shower. (WB, brspok) 
(34)  That is why England’s botched chance to sell cricket to a young public increasingly attracted 
by other sports, will probably be rued for years to come. (WB, times) 
 
In these lexical uses chance(s) can be premodified by a percentage (33) or other specific adjectives such 
as botched in (34). As mentioned earlier, this kind of premodification can be seen as a true lack of 
decategorialization and further proof that chance(s) is truly nominal and lexical here, as its lexical 





In this chapter we have shown that constructions with chance(s) enrich Talmy’s (1988) greater modal 
system in a number of different ways. In their modal uses they are equivalent to core modal auxiliaries 
and encode especially dynamic and epistemic meanings. In addition, dynamic uses can get an objective 
deontic inference when the co-text mentions some sort of authority, in which case the modalized 
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utterance as a whole comes to refer to an ability that is due to or linked to permission being granted. 
Epistemic uses can get volitional inferences when the co-text contains an explicit reference to someone’s 
intentions. Those cases then assess the likelihood of an event and indicate whether the (represented) 
speaker would like this to happen or not. In addition, some constructions are also genuinely vague 
between two modal values, namely dynamic and epistemic meaning. In such examples it is impossible 
and unnecessary to disambiguate between these two, as they refer both to abilities inherent in a situation 
or participant, and an assessment of the likelihood of something happening. Rather than seeing such 
cases with inferences or vagueness as detracting from the grammatical status of these modal uses, we 
want to argue that it is actually part of their assets within the modal paradigm and can be seen as 
pragmatico-semantic enrichment of the modal paradigm (cf. Brems & Davidse 2010). 
 In addition to this type of enrichment, constructions with chance(s) also bring in constructional 
variation and enrichment in at least two ways. Firstly, modal uses can either appear in verbo-nominal 
patterns, forming clausal structures, or as the anaphoric adverbial no chance. In the latter case, it is not 
integrated into a larger unit and functions as an emphatic negative response item to a speech act. With 
regard to verbo-nominal patterns, it was noted that modal uses typically appear with a limited set of very 
frequent light verbs including have and be. Partly because of these verbo-nominal patterns, modal uses 
of chance(s) can still appear with a restricted set of premodifiers, as in have a good/fair/amazing chance. 
We argued that such premodifiers modify the modal value and do not attest to chance still being a noun 
and hence lexical in nature. In addition, the plural form chances can appear in modal uses too. In both 
cases we argue that this partial decategorialization enriches the paradigm by allowing for more fine-
grained and expressive renderings of modal meanings, bringing in constructional templates that 
incorporate slots for potential premodification.  
 Verbo-nominal patterns with chance(s) also further enrich the greater modal system in that they can 
express caused modality, more specifically caused-dynamic and caused-epistemic meanings, the former 
potentially involving a deontic inference. The category of caused-epistemicity, we feel, is new with 
regard to the causative notions already put forward by Talmy (1988). We argued that the category of 
caused modality is not purely grammatical, as it adds a causative operator to basic modal meanings. This 
claim squares with the lexical specificity found among the matrix verbs and premodifiers of chance(s).  
 Constructions with chance(s) also exceed the range of modal auxiliaries because they still have 
lexical uses, which modal auxiliaries typically no longer have. These lexical uses either appear in 
complex predicates such as take (no) chance(s), providing an alternative to ‘to risk’, or in verbo-nominal 
patterns with light verbs that are similar in surface structure to those attested for modal uses. 
Furthermore, there are also regular uses, which do not form part of a larger unit including a verb but 
bring in their complement by themselves. 
 With regard to polarity, finally, we noted that negative polarity is more frequent for modal uses of 
chance(s) constructions overall, but its role seems less important here than for other semiotic nouns, for 
which it was found that negative polarity was a trigger in their grammaticalization (e.g. (no) wonder 
(Van linden et al. 2016; Gentens et al. 2016), (no) doubt (Davidse et al. 2015), (no) way (Davidse et al. 
2014), (no) question (Davidse & De Wolf 2012). In the case of (no) need, in turn, grammatical uses also 
emerged in positive negative polarity contexts, but the data nevertheless show a clear diachronic 
tendency to express more abstract modal meanings (e.g. deontic rather than dynamic) when combined 
with negative polarity (Van linden et al. 2011). Future research is needed to reveal why negation serves 
as a triggering or facilitating factor in some but not in other lemma-specific grammaticalization paths. 
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